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The Blob. 
 
 
Many social and cultural anthropologists hold a belief that they 
usually do not dare express in public lest it should be known that 
they are as arrogant as they really are.  It is that, before anyone 
attempts any of the other social sciences; they should first take a 
degree in anthropology. The reason is that these other 
subordinate social sciences suffer from the delusion that they 
study what people are like; human nature, in other words. 
Anthropologists, on the other hand, believe they know there 
exist no such thing as people as such, only products of particular 
societies or cultures situated in particular places and at particular 
times (Geertz 1973:53). 
 
This position, in its strong form, is silly but what is worst it 
leaves anthropology in an epistemological no-man’s land. If it is 
not representatives of the natural species homo sapiens that 
anthropologists are talking about, what, on earth are they 
dealing with? Not surprisingly this has the effect that other 
scientists have simply ignored this kind of anthropological 
theory.   However, I have sympathy with the motivation behind 
the outrageous position that has led some of my colleagues to 
make such claims.  I know what is meant and I believe the 
proposition is based on important empirical and ethnographic 
considerations which all those who want to understand our 
species need to take into account. 
 
In this lecture I try to rescue the facts and theories that have led 
anthropologists to make such melodramatic propositions by 
building a model where these can be integrated within a 
naturalist framework so that our work as anthropologists can be 
taken seriously and integrated with that from other disciplines. 
(Quine 1969). 
 
The kind of grand anthropological claims I am referring to occur 
when such words as self, the I, agent, subject, person, 
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individual, dividuals, identity, etc. are used.  These terms all 
involve the attempt to describe what it is to be oneself and what 
is assumed to be the way others are understood to be, in this or 
that place. Indeed, we may already note here, that, the 
problematic distinction between self understanding and the 
representation of others is usually unexamined in most of the 
social science literature. 
 
The lumping together of these different terms may well seem to 
be inappropriate, even sloppy, since many authors take great 
pain in distinguishing these words and offering extremely 
precise definitions.  The problem, however comes, when we try 
to put together this massive literature, when, for example, we try 
to relate, Geertz’s discussion of the  Balinese “person” (1973), 
with Dumont’s “individual” (1983) , Mauss’s “moi” (1938) and 
Rosaldo’s “self (1984)1. When I attempt such combination I 
have to admit that I am completely lost and so, you will have to 
excuse me if I refer to this entire indistinct galaxy, some part of 
which, or all of which, these terms seem to refer to, simply as 
the BLOB. This seems particularly justified since, in spite of 
this multiplicity of would-be distinct labels used by 
anthropologists, much the same claims have been made, 
whatever word is used.   
 
Foremost among these claims is that the blob is fundamentally 
culturally and/or historically variable. This is what 
anthropologists mean when they say that there is no such thing 
as human nature, a proposition which poses the general 
epistemological problem I began with. If this is so, of course, 
the blob is totally variable, moulded by history and culture, then 
it is nothing at all, just an arbitrary category of our culture, one 
that groups under various ethnocentric labels things that have 
nothing essentially to do with each other. If so, the blob, under 
whatever labels it masquerades, cannot be a suitable subject for 
theoretical study. 
 
                                                 
1  André Beteille expresses the same frustration. ( Beteille 1991:251)   }. 
 3
 
This problem, however, seems not to be taken very seriously by 
anthropologists in spite of their general predilection for radical 
cultural determinism.  When they actually get down to specifics 
we usually find much less ambitious propositions. Thus, in the 
general arguments, it is not usually proposed that there as many 
blobs as there are cultural variations but rather that there are two 
kinds of blobs in the world.  Sometimes this point is expressed 
generally as a contrast between the modern or western blob and 
the blob of the rest of mankind.  This is, for example, what 
Durkheim argued in The Division of Labour in Society(1893) 
with his distinction between organic and mechanical solidarity.  
 
Similarly Dumont (1982) stresses the same familiar dualist 
contrast of the individualism of the post reformation West, with 
the holism of the hierarchical rest.  The same dichotomy is also 
found in the work of ethnographers or historians who, although 
they talk about particular places, argue that there, or then, the 
self the person, the subject, or what have  you, is different from 
what we, the modern west, have here and/or now.  Thus  Wood 
(2008)   argues  that the very notion of self was absent in 
biblical times,  Snell in the Iliad (1953), Marilyn Strathern 
argues that the New Guinea person is quite different to the 
Western one (1988),  Kondo argues this for the Japanese self,  
McKim Marriot for India (1977), Geertz for Bali (1973), etc.  
The west seems simply used as the contrast to the specific 
situations discussed, but, in fact, it turns out that these very 
varied non-western non-modern places are very similar among 
themselves, places where interiority and individuality is 
devalued but where social relationships and group membership 
dominate.  More recently a further twist has been added with 
some writers arguing that in post-modernity we have now 
arrived at a post-blob, post-modern, stage (Ewing 1990, Markus 
and Kitiyama 1991). This addition might be thought to lead to a 
tripartite division with pre blob, blob and post blob but in fact 
the proposed pre-modern blob and the post-modern blob look 
singularly alike in that they are both non-essentialist, distributed, 
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contextual and divided.  Anthropological arguments about the 
blob can therefore be summarised as saying there is a great and 
absolute divide between the individualist west and the social 
relational rest. 
 
The basis for such repeated exhortation, that we should not 
assume that what we know as the blob is applicable everywhere 
is real enough. It is a common experience of ethnographers who 
work in very different societies and cultural milieus, such as me 
to go no further, to be struck, and indeed even sometimes 
shocked, by how little value is given to individual motivations 
and how roles and group membership are the main, and often 
the only expressed, criteria of right conduct.  This is also 
reflected in certain non modern, non western legal codes such as 
those on which Mauss based himself in his discussion of the 
concept of the person, or in the implications of rituals, such as 
those discussed by Marilyn Strathern which she uses as the basis 
of her analysis of the Melanesian dividuals (Srathern: 1988).  
Such data does seem to produce a view of people as merely 
points in social systems while their internal states, their 
intentions, their absolute individuality and personal desires are 
irrelevant. This dichotomous contrast between the west and 
these “other” societies is often exaggerated (Beteille:1991,  
Leenhardt  1985 Parry 1989).  However, there are very real and 
important differences between cultures which are worth 
discussing.  Thus, it is not my intention to minimise the 
significance of the cultural argued for in the works I have been 
implicitly or explicitly referring to, but instead to ask whether 
the facts that have been noted have the fundamental implications 
for the “construction” of the blob that so many social scientists 
give it? I shall argue they do not but then, by integrating the 
work of anthropologists with that of other scientists, I shall 
place the anthropological ideas within a model that is not 
antagonistic, but compatible, with what other sciences can teach 
us 
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Two writers have already called into question the excesses of 
the relativist position in relation to the blob when it goes under 
the name of “self”. Melford Spiro in a devastating critique of 
authors such as McKim Marriot, Geertz and others demonstrates 
how the evidence used for such dramatic generalisations is 
selective (1993).  As an example, he notes that reference to the 
devaluation of the self in Therevada Buddhism is not, as has 
been suggested, evidence of the absence of the notion in a 
country such as Burma, but rather, of its presence.  In a 
somewhat similar vein Naomi Quinn (2006) criticizes recent 
post-modern writing in anthropology that suggests that the idea 
of the integrated self is outdated and/or wrong on the weak and 
trivial basis of the uncontroversial fact that people can hold 
contradictory ideals.  Her point is that explicit reflexive self 
representation cannot be equated with the blob as it is lived and, 
putting the words in her mouth that I will use below, that we 
must distinguish cognition and meta-representation, that is 
public re-representations about cognition (Sperber 2000).  (I am, 
however, much more hesitant than she is, given our present state 
of knowledge, in identifying various aspects of selfhood directly 
with different types of functional or anatomical areas of the 
brain.)  
 
 
Spiro and Quinn make two convincing and important criticism 
of the work of anthropologists: firstly, they are right that 
anthropological writing about the blob is often spectacularly 
imprecise and, secondly, it is true that claims made in this area 
are commonly of very uncertain epistemological status. I also 
entirely agree with Quinn’s implicit argument that the attempt at 
naturalising what is being talked about would help clear the fog. 
 
The implication of the critiques by Spiro and Quinn is that 
anthropologists are wrong when they make the absolutist claim 
that the blob is simply a product of history and is totally 
culturally variable. Neither author, however, claim that culture 
and society do not have an influence, but the question how, and 
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how far this is so, cannot be advanced until the epistemological 
status of what is claimed is clarified.  Thus, as both Spiro and 
Quinn recognise, it is not that anthropologists are talking about 
nothing in their discussions of self, person, agent, personality, 
identity, but that what it is they are talking about  cannot be 
pinned down.  
 
As Spiro and Quinn have done a good job in criticising much 
anthropological writing, this clears the way for a more positive 
attempt at replacing the anthropology within the wider theory 
they implicitly call for. What follows is the attempt to do this. 
 
*********** 
 
One major problem in social science writing is the lack of any 
serious attempt to distinguish levels in the phenomena to which 
the blob words seem to refer.  It is true that some 
anthropological writers do make a weak attempt at 
distinguishing levels but these are soon forgotten. Thus Mauss 
begins his essay on the self and/or the person in the following 
way: “I [shall not] speak to you of psychology…it is plain…that 
there has never existed a human being who has not been aware, 
not only of his body, but also, at the same time of his 
individuality, both spiritual and physical, …My subject is 
entirely different…the notion that men in different ages have 
formed of  [the self].” (Mauss 1985: 3).  Yet the essay continues 
as a discussion of his “first subject”. Similarly though the other 
way round, Antze and Lambek state in a book about culture and 
memory that autobiographical memory “and the “self” or 
“subject” mutually imply one another.”  P.xxi.   but we then find 
that they slide away from a discussion of the central issue by 
telling us that “our book is less about memory than about 
“memory”…..That is to say it is about how the very idea of 
memory” comes into play in society and culture…” p.xv  (Antze 
and Lambek: 1996). This is presumably local ethno-
psychological theories about whose value they do not commit 
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themselves. Mauss says that he will not talk of psychology but 
does, while Antze and Lambek declare they will but don’t. 
 
Distinguishing levels of the blob is very difficult but essential if 
we are to understand the relation of the blob to culture.  Few 
things have more hindered dialogue between social and 
cognitive sciences than proper consideration of what level we 
are dealing with and of the significance of the relation between 
these levels. 
 
What follows is, therefore, a rough attempt at distinguishing 
levels because it is a necessary preliminary for understanding 
how social science, and especially anthropological, discussions 
concerning the blob can be integrated with what we know from 
other disciplines. Interestingly, distinguishing levels also 
produces a kind of natural history of our species in that what I 
call: the lower levels are characterised by features that we may 
assume are inherited from our very remote pre-mammalian 
ancestors since these are shared with other distant living species, 
while others, here qualified as higher, are unique specialisations 
of our species. The integration of anthropological considerations 
within the wider framework outlined here thus also suggests a 
facilitation of the integration of social science work within 
evolutionary theory (Seeley and Sturm 2006 p. 321ff.) 
 
This preliminary attempt at distinguishing levels is based on the 
work of a number of scholars in cognitive science who tend to 
use one of the names of the blob: the self. Relying on these 
authors is, however, a tricky enterprise since they are not all in 
agreement either.  Fortunately, for the simple purposes of the 
present exercise, it is possible to by-pass the disagreements by 
concentrating on what most are agreed on.   What is crucial is 
that there indeed are very different levels to the blob with the 
deepest levels shared by all living things and the highest levels 
creating the possibility of a narrative reflexive autobiography.  It 
is essential, however to remember that  all the levels one might 
choose to distinguish are simply points in what is a continuum, 
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which means that they are all related to each other even though 
some may be more directly culturally affected while others are 
not. All those involved in the discussions are agreed that 
somewhere in that progression language and reflexivity, meta-
cognition or meta-representation, comes into play (e.g. Neisser 
1988, Damasio 1999).   
 
The list of levels noted below “will do” for the purpose at hand 
and will not probably cause relevant problems for my argument 
although the issues are greatly simplified and the terms used 
very loosely. 
 
First of all we can distinguish a level that has often been labelled 
the “core self”  (Slide 1). Some aspects of this are very general 
indeed. These involve two things 1) a sense of ownership and 
location of one’s body, 2) a sense that one is author of one’s 
own actions (David et al. 2008, Vogeley et al 2003).  This type 
of selfhood must be shared by all animate creatures since, as 
Dennett puts it, even a lobster who relishes claws, must know 
not to eat his own (Dennet1991:429). (I suspect that even the 
most dedicated cultural relativist is unlikely to argue that this 
level varies from one human group to another.) It should be 
noted that the word “sense”, as I have applied it to this level, is 
used here in a particularly thin way, implying no reflexive 
awareness whatsoever. However it must also be stressed that, 
even at this level, we are dealing with quite complex cognition 
as Descartes discussion of phantom limbs long ago emphasised, 
and also as is shown experimentally by more recent 
experiments, such as those with the rubber hand where a subject 
can be made to feel sensations in a model arm (Botvinick and 
Cohen: 1998).  
 
Above this level is one often labelled the “minimal self”.  (Slide 
2) This involves the sense of continuity in time. Many animals 
from crows to chimpanzees have this sense of their own 
continuity and that they, like us, attribute a similar continuity in 
time to their con-specifics (Hauser et al. 1995). This sense of 
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continuity in time is essential for the use of any type of longer 
term memory and seems essential for more advanced cognition 
such as the ability of self recognition, demonstrated, for 
example, in recognising one self in a mirror.  Animals such as 
chimpanzees and gorillas can do this.  Interestingly this sense of 
continuity of oneself and others is particularly developed in 
social species. (Emery and Clayton 2004).  Here again, when we 
are dealing with this level, the word sense is used in a thin way. 
It does, however, imply the ability to “time travel” that is to use 
information about the past for present behaviour which involves 
being in the past in imagination, and the ability to plan future 
behaviour which requires being in the future in imagination.  
Nonetheless, it implies no reflexive awareness of the mental 
state that one is in. It involves the short term memory necessary 
to organise episodes, usually referred to as episodic memory  
(Conway 2001) and it involves the retention of some such 
episodic memories without these being woven into a coherent 
story, at least one which is recoverable in consciousness.   
 
Conscious access requires a higher stage which I call here, 
following a number of authors, “the narrative self” (Dennett 
1992, Humphrey and Dennett 1989) (Slide 3).  In some earlier 
writing autobiographical memory was practically synonymous 
with the self but this is clearly misleading if we remember levels 
such as those indicated by the terms “core self” and “minimal 
self” and so the term “narrative self” was created to both 
maintain and limit the scope of the link.  The narrative self and 
autobiographical memory imply each other (Tulving 1985).  All 
humans create, at least after the age of three or four, such an 
autobiography though it remains an open question whether this 
is also done by other animals (Gallup 1970). The narrative self 
significantly involves reflexive interaction with others so that 
the self can become, in Mead’s words “an object to one’s self in 
virtue of one’s social relation to other individuals” (Mead  
1962:172 cited in Zahavi ND). 
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Before we go further I want to stress a point to which I shall 
return and which will become central for my argument.  The 
distinction between levels proposed here is not discontinuous 
and these are not fully separable. We are dealing with a 
continuum (SLIDE 4). 
 
A difficult questions about autobiographical memory and the 
narrative self revolve around the questions whether it need be 
conscious, how far it requires language, and how far it can be 
equated with the stories that people actually tell about 
themselves (Nelson 2003) (Bloch 1998).  
 
Some authors, such as Dennett and Ricoeur (1985), have argued 
that this level necessarily implies consciousness, language and 
the ability to tell stories about oneself, in other words explicitly 
expressed autobiographical memory.  The difficulty with the 
notion of the “narrative self” comes precisely from this lumping 
together of different elements. Does the autobiography of 
autobiographical memory need be conscious or merely 
consciously accessible? Do autobiographical memory and the 
“narrative self” require language and, if not, is there not a non-
linguistic narrative self, to be distinguished from a linguistic 
level? How far are we dealing with cognition or meta-cognition, 
with representations or meta-representations?  In other words is 
having an autobiography the same thing as being aware that one 
has an autobiography? Is talking about one’s autobiographical 
past the same as having and using such an autobiographical 
memory?  A capacity, which, it is most likely, we share with 
non-linguistic anthropoids.  
 
These difficulties have been highlighted by the philosopher 
Galen Strawson in his discussion of the notion of the “narrative 
self” (Strawson 2005).  He argues that within his own culture  
(English culture since like most philosophers it is the only one 
he considers) there are some people who are into creating 
conscious autobiographical narratives about themselves, these 
he calls “diachronics” and others, like himself, who are just not 
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interested in doing this. It is not their rhetorical style. He calls 
these latter people, somewhat unfortunately, “episodics”.  
 
Strawson convinces me that one should indeed separate those 
with who merely manifest an “episodic self”, which does not 
involve a conscious and explicit expression of the kind of 
autobiography that one would talk about in natural 
circumstances, from those who manifest a  “diachronic” self 
who have a strong sense of having a narrative autobiographical 
self or an “I that is a mental presence now, was there in the past, 
and will be there in the future” and who, most likely, go on 
about it (Strawson 1999:109).   
 
Strawson talks of two different types of people but this is so at 
the phenomenological level only.  However, I would argue that, 
in terms  of the constitution of the blob, both lots, in spite of 
different outward behaviour, have a narrative self. Only some 
people, Strawson’s diachronics, have  an extra.  They engage in 
a particular form of activity which involves creating  a meta-
representational diachronic narrative self by talking about their 
feelings, their inner states and their autobiography. 
 
 If that is so Strawson is suggesting an answer to the questions 
which I argued are muddled together. The stories that some 
people tell about themselves or about the nature of selves in 
their cultures are a quite different matter to whether they have a 
narrative self or no.  Everybody has a narrative self.  Some 
people go in for meta-representing this. (Slide 5) Others do not 
or do so much less so, because, as Zahavi puts it “we should no 
make the mistake of confusing the reflective, narrative grasp of 
a life with the pre-reflective experiences that make up that life 
prior to the experiences being organised into a narrative” 
(Zahavi ND).  It follows from the sharp distinction I make 
between meta-representational activity and the  narrative self 
that the latter does not require language. 
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The difference between Strawson’s two types of people is thus 
much less fundamental than the differences in levels that I have 
been discussing so far. Indeed the fact that diachronics go in for 
meta-representations of themselves may be considered as a quite 
different matter than the constitution of the blob. Explicit 
manifestations are public acts and as such are determined by the 
social and cultural context in which they occur.   Thus, at the 
level of discourse, Strawson’s diachronics and episodics will 
appear very different in that they will sometimes talk about 
different things and possibly sometimes act in different ways but 
this does not mean that they belong to quasi different species, in 
fact the difference is little more than one of rhetorical style. 
 
************* 
 
And this is where I return to anthropology.  At the beginning of 
this lecture I recounted how many anthropologists seem to argue 
that there are two different kinds of people in the world. What I 
believe they were talking about was something much less 
fundamental. They are distinguishing between the people who 
Strawson call diachronics and those he calls episodics. This is a 
difference which I rephrased as between these people who have 
got into the habit of talking about their inner states and those 
who don’t.  This is an interesting difference but it does not mean 
that mankind is divided into two quasi species as is implied in 
the works I criticise. A surface difference is taken as a 
difference in substance. What such a mistake leads to is well 
illustrated by Unni Wikan in her criticism of Geertz depiction of 
the Balinese self  (Wikan: 1990). 
 
In those societies where, for historical/cultural reasons, it is 
acceptable, even encouraged, to talk about internal states of 
mind, individual motivations and autobiography there are many 
diachronics and these will often take centre stage.  It should be 
noted however that, as they do this, they are not exposing their 
selves, their individuality, their personhood, their agency, to the 
harsh light of day.  They are doing something quite different, 
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they are telling stories about themselves to others, which should 
not be mistaken for the complex business of being oneself 
among others. What they are doing when they are being 
diachronics, and this is the implicit point of Quinn’s criticism of 
post modernists, is interpreting those few aspects of their blob 
that are easily available to their consciousness, and then  re-
representing them as best they can, in other words  meta-
representing them.  This makes clear the error of the direct 
“representational” reading that anthropologists have made of 
such meta-representational activity, which has led them to 
consider discourse about the self and others to be what it is a 
representation of. 
 
In societies where, in most contexts, such meta-representational 
talk about one’s internal states and motivations is thought 
inappropriate or even immoral, discourse will obviously not 
normally be psychologically oriented but will be much more 
about the rules of behaviour that should be followed in groups, 
roles, rights and duties and exchange systems. This is my 
experience among the more remote Malagasy groups I have 
studied. 2It does not seem to me that such emphasis means we 
find there an alternative self, different from the self of the west 
where the rhetorical emphasis is on individuality and interiority.  
It is simply that anthropologists, missing their familiar meta-
discourse about the blob, when they are in societies where the 
glorifying of diachronics does not take place, therefore 
concentrate on the discourse about relations and morality, 
which, in any case, is found in all societies.  The 
anthropologists, quite misleadingly, make this into a compatible, 
if alternative, blob, a kind of substitute concept of the person, or 
the individual, or the self or the agent, while in fact it is nothing 
of the sort. There is thus no basis for a contrast between two 
types of blob.  
                                                 
2 Though it is important to note also that such talk about internal 
states can easily be generated as it can in England, thus showing 
that it exists in some contexts.  This I have described in a 
number of recent publications (Bloch 2005). 
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This is all the more so as, most likely, we are dealing with a 
statistical difference not a categorical one. If the people of 
modern Britain are, as Strawson argues, divided between 
phenomenological diachronics and episodics it is likely that the 
relative proportions are affected by the culture of Britain not 
merely by individual dispositions.  If that is the case, it is also 
likely that in other cultures, these proportions will be different.  
In my experience talk about internal states and individual 
motivations does occur in Malagasy villages, although rarely. 
The individualist, self reflexive blob cultures of the west, are 
merely  those where a lot of people go in a lot for diachronic 
narratives while the “others” are ones where people are rarely 
tempted to go in for meta-representation of their internal 
feelings3.  
                                                 
3  
This is particularly important in making us realise the 
fundamental difference in the ways we know others and 
ourselves. We only have empirical access to the blob of others 
through their explicit discourse and outward behaviour. 
Although we may, consciously or unconsciously guess at what 
might lie below, for most practical purposes we don’t need to go 
beyond outward manifestations for interaction and these  are of 
a different character to being  myself and, anyway, greatly 
simplified.  On the other hand, although we may also imagine 
ourselves as seen through the eyes of others, this will only be a 
minor part of our blob, most levels of which, as I have argued 
are below the level of consciousness. 
 
This difference between knowledge of ourselves and others is 
important not just theoretically but also methodologically as it is 
relevant to the way we can use the work of anthropologists in 
the general enterprise in which I am engaged.  Anthropologists 
inevitably can only study others. They are thus tempted to use 
the representations we use when dealing with others as though 
they were simply the “person” in this or that place.  
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******* 
 
I have used Strawson’s distinction between episodics and 
diachronics to show that anthropology’s two kinds of people are 
nothing of the sort. Much of what anthropologists have been 
talking about is about meta-representations and not therefore 
directly relevant to the constitution of the blob. Now that we 
have got away from meta-representation we find with relief  that 
human beings exist after all! 
 
However, an unfortunate conclusion could be drawn from the 
above. It might appear at this point that what I have argued is 
that meta-representations of the blob are cultural and that the 
blob itself is natural. This might be a modification to their 
theory that some culturalists or anti-culturalists might not have 
too much difficulty in accepting. They could then say: let the 
different disciplines get on with their own thing, the 
anthropologist talk about meta-representations and the cognitive 
scientists talk about the fundamental blob. This would be totally 
misleading.   
 
Anthropologists’ unintentional focus on meta-representations 
has simply meant that they have avoided considering what they 
thought was their central purpose: the study of the social, 
cultural and historical character of the blob. That job remains to 
be done or, rather, begun. This I attempt to approach 
schematically in the last part of this lecture. 
 
 
********** 
 
First  of all it is important to remember the most significant fact 
that the levels of the blob I have distinguished so far are merely 
heuristic indications of points in what is a continuum from the 
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core self to the narrative self (Squire:1992)4. (Slide 4) None of 
the levels are separate and all interact. Thus the narrative self is 
continuous with the primate wide requirements of the minimal 
self and the minimal self is continuous with the living kind wide 
requirements of the core self. Similarly the narrative self will be 
continuous with the minimal self which will itself will be 
affected by the core self. We are psychologically and physically 
one. 
 
But there is also another aspect to the continuum of the blob. As 
soon as we are moving to the higher levels we are also moving 
from the internal and private level of such factors as the 
awareness of ownership of one’s body and its location; towards 
the public, and therefore inevitably social, expressions of the 
narrative self.  
 
This gradual move from the private to the public and above all 
its internal continuity is particularly important if we are to 
understand how the cultural/historical affects the blob. We 
might be tempted to assume that the private is untouched by the 
cultural while the public, caught up in social discourse, is 
entirely cultural.  This would be misleading because it would 
forget the continuity of the blob through its various levels. The 
blob is a process. It is not a matter of a binary contrast but one 
of more or less. In other words, like icebergs the blob is 90% 
submerged but the exposed part has no real independent 
existence without the submerged part and vice versa. 
 
But to the internal continuity of the blob must be added another 
continuity: that between blobs. This I have not considered so far. 
 
It is by means of the continual exchange between individuals 
that the cultural and, therefore, the historical character of the 
blob comes about.  This has been so well discussed recently that 
                                                 
4 Squire shows that the old distinction between declarative and 
non declarative memory is not neurologically based.}  
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I therefore take as read (Sperber 1985 Dawkins 1976 Dennett 
1995  Tomassello 1999).  
 
Thus the analogy with icebergs can also mislead because, unlike 
icebergs, the exposed parts of the different blobs are not fully 
distinct one from another. They are organically united with each 
other.  We are a social species and, as is the case for other social 
species, the fully isolated Cartesian individual cannot be 
anything than a doubtful thought experiment. It is through this 
continual complex social exchange between individuals, which 
characterises our species, that history/culture becomes part of 
the process that is the blob.  This is so because this interchange, 
in the case of humans, is part of a process which involves not 
only the interaction of  presently living public parts of blobs but 
also the indirect inter-creation  of the public parts of living blobs 
with the once public parts of dead blobs, in some cases public 
parts of blobs dead long ago. 
 
The blob is not just situated in this process it is itself moulded 
and modified by it to a significant degree. That the social and 
cultural character to a certain extent creates the blob has been 
stressed again and again in both the social science and the 
cognitive science literature, as it was in the remarks from Mead 
I quoted above.  The social and communicative aspect of 
humans has meant that the boundary of the individual organism 
in a species such as our own is blurred in that we go in and out 
of each others bodies, not only because of the physiological  
processes of birth and sex but also  through the neuro-
psychological processes of the synchronisation of minds that 
occurs in social exchange. (Humphrey (2007; Bloch 2007). 
(Slide 6) 
 
This process of inter-creation and historical creation is of course 
what social scientists and especially social and cultural 
anthropologists have been traditionally emphasising. It is 
essential to any theory of the blob. The exposed parts of 
different blobs are to a varying  extent continuous with each 
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other and this is not just at the narrative self levels but also for 
some aspects of lower levels evoked by the term the minimal 
self, since simpler but essential  forms of joint action and 
therefore interchange also exist.  The merging of public parts of 
blobs is never complete since differentiation of one’s blob from 
that of others is as necessary for the social process as is the inter 
penetration of different blobs.  
 
However, it is striking that those authors, whether social or 
cognitive scientists who have discussed this interpenetration 
through exchange, when they are focussing on the topic, seem to 
forget the simultaneously relevant internal multi level character 
of the blob. 
 
This leads me to my very simple conclusion about the blob.  The 
blob is simultaneously caught up in two quite different 
continuities both of which link at either of their poles what are 
essentially alien elements.  One continuum links up, and to a 
certain extent merges, different but nonetheless distinct blobs, 
different people linked by social ties, in other words.  The other 
continuum links the totally sub conscious core with the 
potentially re-represented narrative level. As is the case of the 
social link, elements that are essentially different are partially 
united into a not fully integrated, or integratable, whole.   
 
Thinking of either of these continuities is bad enough but we 
have to think of them together! If we do not, the difficult 
phenomenon we have to try to understand drains away with the 
bath water and we are left with concepts that cannot be related 
to anything in nature. The error of those psychologists, that such 
social scientists as Durkheim criticised, is that they forgot the 
continuous social historical continuum and thus make the 
mistakes that most first year anthropology students have 
explained to them again and again (without it being mentioned 
that the targets of their strictures have for the most part long 
disappeared from the scene). The error of the anthropologists I 
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have criticised is that they forget the simultaneous internal 
continuum.    
 
********** 
 
In some ways the model that I have been building up during the 
course of this lecture can be seen as a reconciliation of the kind 
of ideas that have characterised anthropological writing on the 
blob with that which has been produced by cognitive science. 
This is so in so far as I have attempted to make room for the 
kinds of observations that have come from both sides within a 
unified system. 
 
Talking of reconciliation might be suitable for a valedictory 
lecture but it also obscures the fundamental criticism of my own 
discipline that I have been making. Let me state it brutally.  
Social scientists, for all sorts of reasons, have believed, even 
glorified, in ignoring the biological, neurological and 
psychological aspects in their models.  On the whole, they have 
only looked at meta-representations of the blob and, 
occasionally, at the narrative level. They then have either 
pretended that these  levels were the blob or they have argued 
that these levels were clearly distinct from other levels, thereby 
implicitly importing the kind of nature/culture dichotomy that, 
in another register, they denounce. 
 
Such solutions are just ways of avoiding the central difficulty of 
thinking about our species, a difficulty which makes 
anthropology so difficult and so exiting. Anthropological 
representations of the human blob have to be compatible with 
the multiplicity of empirically inseparable processes within 
which we exists. All living things are caught in two processes 
phylogeny and ontogeny5. When we are dealing with our species 
                                                 
5 Our models must, therefore, talk of living things whose 
specificity, explicitly or implicitly, is comprehensible as the 
product of the process of natural selection. This is done I 
suggested here in that I have suggested something of the 
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we have to add a third process: that of history. This I have 
included and revised in the discussion of cultural interaction. 
  
 
Only a model of the blob which can, even if does not, handle the 
combination of these three processes, will do. Social and 
cultural anthropologists often express the fear that the 
introduction of cognitive or biological considerations will lead 
to reductionism. This danger exists, but ironically blatant 
misleading cases of reductionism are much more common in the 
work of those who argue for the independence of the cultural 
process and forget the internal continuities. When this is done, 
as is the case with the work of the social scientists I have been 
implicitly criticising, we run the risk of producing misleading 
theoretical formulations that greatly exaggerate the ontological 
significance of cultural variation. Even more dangerously we 
move what we want to understand into a hazy land, where 
nothing can be situated in nature, and where mysterious words, 
such as those which I have merged together to create the blob, 
proliferate, without anyone being able to explain how they relate 
to each other. This, of course, is inevitable when we are in the 
never-never  land of culture without minds. Such a situation 
makes science impossible and even misleads the ethnographer, 
who, in the difficult process of interpretation, loses all guide 
lines. 
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